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1 Introduction
'I hate uselessly precise figures of chaotic and
absolute
statistics, that tell nothing, and 1 rely on the
reader's gratitude on whom I
have not inflicted the pain of reading them or the
mortification of skipping them.'
translated from Ciocca 1933: 243'
The sprouting of high-technology, small- and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) around Academy
of Sciences' institutes was first noticed during field
visits to Novosibirsk,' Siberia. We have defined
euphemistically as sputnik company creation' the
creation of satellite enterprises from scientific and
research centres, due to the link with the parent
organisation that persists throughout the life-cycle
of the new ventures, Similar to the spin-off phe-
nomenon in Western economies, this process
shows specific characteristics linked to the particu-
lar economic environment.
The process studied is a key element in the devel-
opment of the local, regional and national econ-
omy This is even more relevant considering that
Siberia is richly endowed with natural resources,
which are still underexploited by a backward
industry The future of research in Russia is also
inevitably affected by this phenomenon.
The 1992 rupture made possible and forced a
recasting of the rules of exploitation of the scientific
system inherited from the socialist era. This revi-
sion was sanctioned by a tacit agreement between
those who administered and controlled and those
who were administered and controlled.
To describe the process, more emphasis was given
'lo odio le cifre inutilmente precise delle statistiche
caotiche e assolute, che non dicono nulla, e confide nella
gratitudine del lettore a cui non ho inJlítto ni, la pena di
doverle leggere ni, la nsortificazione di doverle saltare.'
The research in Akademgorodok, Novosibirsk was
partially financed by the European Commission
Programme for Cooperation in Science and Technology
with CCE/NIS, INCO/COPERNICUS - 1995/96. Title of
the project: Adaptation to the new environment of the
Science Academy institutes in Russia. Analysis of the
socialist and post-socialist situation of the Science
Academy institutes in Russia and their mode of
adaptation: the case of Akademgorodok.'
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to qualitative description than quantitative analysis.
This seemed inevitable as the research was mostly
based on case studies resulting from visits and inter-
views carried out in Novosibirsk province (oblast).
Moreover, it is our belief that the opposite
approach, where too much stress is given to figures,
would not lead to a correct interpretation of the
topic under survey
2 The effects of the collapse of
the Soviet system on the research
institutes
The rupture
In March 1990 the 28th Communist Party Congress
cancelled Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, thus
abolishing the leading role of the party The plan-
ning process also disappeared, along with the party
From January 1992 on, a new pricing system was
enacted and mass privatisation programmes were
undertaken. For institutes of the Academy of
Sciences this implied a financial and structural nip-
ture. The former mode of financing had linked
research plans and budgets. But now, plans, research
tasks and most of the related funds were withheld
from the institutes, affecting allocations to personnel
and wages, supplies, equipment and so on.
The institutes
had to earn their keep: find non-state means to
finance their activity;
were free to select their own research projects
and link them to their own financing strategies;
were free to look for financial resources and allo-
cate them as they pleased: free to buy their
equipment from any company, decide the quota
of revenues to cover costs (wages, general
expenses, social sphere expenditures).
Up to 1992 all research financing came from the
state. After the rupture these sources had to be
diversified. As an example, the 1995 budget of the
Boreskov Institute of Catalysis included the follow-
ing items:
43 % Contracts with foreign industries
25 % State budget
20 % Competitive programme
6% Contracts with Russian industries
3% Russia Fund for Fundamental Research
2 % International Fund for Research
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Contracts from industry came to nearly one half of
the total.
The state budget for research is voted each year by
the Duma (parliament) and allocated through the
Ministry of Science and Technology to the Academy
of Sciences institutes. The competitive programmes
are open research tenders of local and regional
authorities or of ministries. The international funds
for research include sponsors such as the European
Commission, the Soros Foundation, USAID and
ISTC.
In this situation the institutes have to face problems
such as:
difficulties in paying all employees an appropri-
ate wage. By 1993 the average wage of scientists
had fallen to 65 per cent of the average wage in
Russia (CCET 1994: 75). The decrease in state
funding prevented the Academy of Sciences
from preserving real wage levels.
the impossibility of sustaining the same number
of research projects. A strict internal selection of
research activities has to be carried out.
the necessity of introducing new managerial and
operative mechanisms into the institutes. The
institutes' managers acquire new managerial
skills to implement the changes needed: build
their own restructuring strategy in terms of
research domains and development of commer-
cial applications. Financially and strategically
they can no longer keep open all scientific fields
explored so far, without linking them with a
possible source of funding and hence of
economic return.
Immediate consequences for the research
institutes
Institutes had to reduce the scope of their research
and support only that which they could afford.
Decisions were taken according to financial con-
straints, and therefore acquired an economic ratio-
nale - a new procedure that the socialist model of
managing the institutes had ignored.
Funding of uneconomic research was stopped, leav-
ing the researchers and technicians themselves to
find ways and means to continue their work in the
institutes. In most cases they continued to receive a
wage devalued in real terms and, though enrolled in
Figure 1: Decline of the workforce in the Siberian branch RAN Research Institutes, 1991-96
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the institutes, received little or no support for their
scientific and research activity
Many institute employees faced difficulties:
empty wallets rapidly growing inflation with
no salary correction
frustration professional skills no longer
considered useful under new
economic criteria
uncertainty end of a privileged situation in
the new economic context
disenchantment the system in which they
believed and for which they
worked had failed3.
With this perspective, the 1992 rupture pushed
many to leave the research institutes and look for
opportunities in commerce and industry A limited
Between 10 per cent and 50 per cent of employees in
'tkademgorodok institutes were in extreme need of
psychological support', according to research funded by
the Federal Agency for Unemployment carried out in
1992 and 1994. Another survey carried Out fl May/June
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number preferred to continue their academic and
scientific career overseas (700 for all Russia accord-
ing to the president of the Science Academy4).
Figure 1 shows that for the Siberian branch of the
Russian Academy of Sciences (Russkaya Akademiya
Nauk, or RAN), the brain drain was limited (-17.1
per cent between 1991 and 1996). The number of
research fellows started to decrease in 1993 with an
acceleration in 1995 (-6.8 per cent) and 1996 (-5.9
per cent). Statistics on employment show a steeper
decrease of technicians and non-scientific person-
nel (such as workers involved in the social sphere)
than researchers. The total number of workers in
the Siberian branch research institutes fell to
38,171 in 1996 from a peak of 52,736 in 1991 (-
27.7 per cent), the biggest decrease being in 1992
(-5,474 workers).
1997 on 560 scientists found that 40 per cent were
living below the poverty line and food was the main
concern for 58 per cent of them (cited from an oral
presentation by the coordinator of this research).
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 8 November 1997
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Why is the decrease for the less educated categories
greater than that for scientists? An acceptable expla-
nation could be as foIlows.
Scientists and research fellows:
were less attractive to and less attracted by
industry and commerce, which have a lower
capacity for absorbing people whose major
experience focusses on academic and scientific
research. On the other hand, technicians and
specialised support labour working in research
institutes can adapt more easily to positions in
the productive sector. Highly qualified engineers
with hands-on experience in innovative tech-
nologies are in strong demand in an economy in
transformation.
were freer to reallocate their working time than
the other categories of workers. Most of the
institutes executives understood that one way
not to lose their main asset (scientific know-
how) was to grant sufficient freedom.
Researchers were allowed and even encouraged,
for their personal economic benefit, to continue
activities no longer supported by the institute.
were generally given priority of payment over
technicians and administrative employees. After
1992, institutes were free to adopt their own
policy concerning the allocation of state bud-
gets.
3 Creation of sputnik enterprises:
reorganisation of inherited
research assets as high-
technology enterprises
The social and economic situation laid down the
conditions for the creation of spin-offs from
research institutes, a process labelled above as 'sput-
nik enterprise creation': the establishment and
development of a new independent entrepreneurial
organisation. This is the transformation of an exist-
ing organisation into a structure combining highly
skilled labour with the physical and non-physical
assets of science and technology in a new way, with
the ultimate objective of obtaining profits from its
activities.
These considerations emerged during the interviews
carried out in Akademgorodok.
6 It appears that an informal understanding existed
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Independence requires the newly established enter-
prise to maintain the capacity to make autonomous
decisions concerning its activities. This is often the
result of establishing new enterprises from scratch,
not linked to formal intervention by any authority
or existing economic entity It thus differs from the
privatisation of former state organisations, but
includes privatised units if these are transformed in
the manner described above.
This process was observed to be the main way in
which high-technology entrepreneurial ventures
have been set up in the science city of
Akademgorodok, Novosibirsk province. It covers a
wide range of cases: from the transformation of an
existing research unit into a de jure enterprise, to the
commercial exploitation of one innovative idea with
a de facto but not legally recognised activity The
common basic feature observed in the creation of
high-technology companies is the transfer of know-
how from research institutes.
The incubation phase
Autonomous ventures need a period of gestation.
During this period the founders of a future enter-
prise usually remain employed at their institute
while spending part of their work time formulating
the new business idea, The organisation for which
they work is known as the 'incubator' where new
ideas are conceived and developed. The risk of fail-
ure is limited to the time, efforts and working capi-
tal already used. Until the founders have left the
parent organisation, failure in establishing the new
venture has no dramatic effects other than
psychological ones.
In Akademgorodok, researchers often remained
employed at the institutes receiving a salary (even
though devalued by inflation and on several occa-
sions paid months late) and social services.
Research personnel were allowed to remain on the
institute's premises and use their time freely6
between research (often no longer financed by the
institute) and activities that could compensate for
low income.
between institutes and researchers. The latter were free to
allocate half of their work time for activities other than
research for the institute. This included research work
carried out inside the institute for personal aspirations.
After 1992, this status soon became advantageous
for both the institute and the researchers. The insti-
tutes could preserve skilled staff, equipment and
facilities with a minimal financial outlay Scientists
continued research work inside the institute in
order to produce applications hoping to yield a
rofit from them. To do so they used the instituteh
cquipment and facilities and their colleagues'
cmbodied know-how. The situation secured social
peace and reduced the risk of mass defections of
researchers whose project budgets had been
stopped or reduced. It was meant to be a temporary
solution to preserve non-physical assets (knowl-
edge) and physical assets (equipment, instruments)
until better days. Institutes could not always pay
their researchers adequately and feared an exodus
towards more rewarding activities. The labour force
was their most precious asset, embodying scientific
and technical knowledge, as well as the entire rela-
tional network. To lose this labour force could jeop-
ardise the institutes' existence.
Starting capital: founder's expertise and
seizure of institute's scientific and
technical knowledge
Many researchers chose to exploit research results
and applications, the outcome of the institutes' past
activities and of their latest work. Often a team from
the same laboratory, these researchers would find
their own way to the market.
In the Soviet Union the state had held the exclusive
right to exploit scientific and technological (S&T)
discoveries. Scientists and researchers whose S&T
findings were of some importance were rewarded
with an author's certificate. This document nomi-
nally7 recognised the paternity and granted a sym-
bolic pecuniary reward. It gave no property rights
to the author or the institute, property being an
alien concept in the Soviet system. The new legisla-
tion introduced property rights for inventions, dis-
coveries, industrial designs, innovations and so on.
Authors' certificates could now be legally translated
into patents, granting an exclusive property right.
The number of certificates compelled the institutes
to convert only those that seemed economically
rewarding. The translation fees discouraged the
institutes from engaging in this procedure.
37
Moreover, many certificates were held on to by the
authors, and legislation regulating the translation of
author certificates into propriety rights generated
conflicts between institutes and authors.
The launch of the high-tech venture: low
initial working capital
The new independent enterprises are created with
no venture capital from banks, financial or state
organisations. Working capital is supplied entirely
by the founders' personal savings. The develop-
ment, testing and prototyping of the applications8
to be marketed are necessarily carried out with a
low initial cash injection from the new entrepre-
neurs, initial working capital being limited to cov-
ering supplies and low-cost equipment. Clients'
prepayments cover expenses like purchase of parts
for the construction of applications/prototypes,
payment of sub-contractors (for example the cast-
ing of metal parts in a foundry), etc. This is due to
the high insolvency risk of Russian firms and the
difficulties in finding legal means to cover this
danger. Stocks too are limited to the basics (raw
material, semi-finished or components) for the
completion of the production cycle.
To reduce all unnecessary costs to a minimum, new
ventures also avoid constituting themselves as for-
mal legal entities at the beginning of their activity
They register only after their business has consoli-
dated andlor when it seems necessary to increase
their clients' portfolio. Founders remain closely
related to the parent institute, exploiting their local
intimate network of scientific, business and political
connections. The link with the parent institute and
with the local scientific community is an important
feature throughout the entire life of the spin-off,
before and after breaking away from the parent
organisation.
The new high-tech ventures in Akademgorodok are
like satellites orbiting around one or more research
institutes. The orbit is very tight initially, gradually
loosening up as the new enterprise consolidates,
though still receiving vital input from the research
institute(s). The founders act as a cooperative of
professionals, each conveying their scientific exper-
tise in the new venture, often concretised by one or
The author's name was printed on the certificate. number of customers (often one application for a single
Usually one application, developed for a limited client).
more author's certificates. They have a clear orien-
tation and share the means to exploit their scïentific
domain from their common past work at the insti-
tute and the gestation of their venture.
The first clients are known from the incubation
phase. They are usually limited in number and soon
new clients must be found and/or new products
developed. New products are usually an improve-
ment of original prototypes made to suit a new cus-
tomer. For these, R&D phases are mainly carried
out inside the parent research institute, limiting
expenditure to immediate supplies. New and old
clients are asked for prepayments to cover larger
expenditures for the completion of the applications
ordered. The main input of the enterprise (S&T
know-how) still originates with the founders.
Consolidation of high-technology spin-offs
The situation described above initially contributes
to lower entry barriers in the creation of new enter-
prises. Re-arrangements of assets into new activities
and new structures is not free from conflict, which
is more or less open, with the incubator institutes.
Allowing their skilled personnel independently to
find the means to reward research was meant to be
a temporary trade-off, accepted in order to preserve
the institutes' assets. Otherwise, the researchers
would have left en masse, imploding an empty
structure. This danger remains, but with the risk
now spread between the institutes and the newly
created high-tech enterprises. The institutes still
rely mainly on financial resources that are both low
for their size and risky - and consist mainly of
short-term contracts with industry - and on state
budgets and programmes. The new enterprises are
undercapitalised and can carry out only a minimal
part of the R&D for new applications outside the
institutes' premises.
Links with the incubator institute can weaken or
strengthen. In either case they evolve into formal
agreements that regulate the use of the institut&s
equipment and facilities, and sometimes also
arrange the use of the building itself for business
activities. The nature and extent of agreements dif-
fer from case to case. In most simple cases the enter-
prise pays a rent. In other cases the enterprise and
the institute become partners, sharing profits for
one particular business activity while remaining
independent organisations.
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Once created, these new SMEs use the institute's
network: relations with the affiliated design bureau,
with industry, with other research institutes.
Marketing efforts are intensified through the exist-
ing network of contacts. For instance, new clients
are often connected to or referred by previous
clients, technical and company brochures are
printed, advertising is done in local specialised
journals, or articles related to the technology
exploited are published in local and foreign scien-
tific journals.
As already noted, an existing client may well ask for
new applications requiring more investment in
R&D. Generally, the clienG portfolio is limited and
has to be extended with tailored innovative applica-
tions. There is a natural demand for high-tech prod-
ucts that exploit a similar S&T base but which have
differentiated applications and development
phases. This forces the newly created enterprise to
keep its R&D effort high and maintain a flexible,
creative approach to customer.
The need to expand beyond the institute's bound-
aries encourages the introduction of more defined
roles and responsibilities inside the new firms.
Founders gradually specialise in a specific manage-
rial position, as well as that of researcher or
innovator. Although this does not imply a rigid def-
inition of positions inside the enterprise, it helps
focus managerial effort and is more effective.
Emerging managerial needs could include, for
example, advertising, concluding agreements with
the parent or other institutes to use research facili-
ties, or networking with local enterprises or
authorities.
In this environment, innovation is continuous and
mass production does not exist. The demand for
standardised products is weak. This has proved to
be a protective mechanism for high-tech SMEs in
Akademgorodok. When this is not the case, the
amount of S&T and R&D falls and the sputnik
company transforms a low-rate financial environ-
ment and murky business practices into a commer-
cial enterprise doomed to suffer from its lack of
economies of scale. The high-tech SMEs are small,
headed by scientists, undercapitalised and not
meant to be manufacturing firms relying on a single
innovation.
One important aspect is that a direct relationship
now exists with the clients, who are also the end-
users of the innovation. This phenomenon did not
exist under socialism and was one of the causes of
the low effectiveness of the diffusion of technology
to industry. The market is competitive by nature
and the SMEs are doomed to enter a continuous
cycle of innovation. After the first project has gone
from research to development, production and sale,
the SME undertakes new research. At this stage the
enterprise has stabilised, new slightly differentiated
products based on the same S&T are developed for
similar final uses and a few workers are hired for
unskilled work when needed.
Modes of growth of spin-offs
In the second stage of their development, the SMEs
were observed to choose between two modes of
growth:
1 Growth by expansion: new researchers are
accepted by the company. They bring in new
skills and innovative applications, while the
SMF offers them scientific, technical, logistical
and financial support. But the new individuals
are usually not part of the SME and receive no
wage. They eventually share the profits only
from the commercial activity towards which
their research has contributed.
2 Growth by division: new independent sub-
sidiaries are created for new business areas/pro-
jects. This step usually follows the taking on of
new researchers and investment in new R&D
axes. In this second case the SME is not endan-
gered by the failure of a new project and the risk
involved in branching out into new business is
spread between the subsidiaries.
The high-tech enterprises are likely to develop as
industrial research laboratories, initially organised
according to the first scheme: several departments
of a single organisation. The next step is the trans-
formation into independent subsidiaries. This step
is taken when the risk increases with the inclu-
sion/enlargement of R&D projects. New projects
imply a high level of risk for a small under-capi-
talised enterprise, due to the time needed to com-
plete the R&D cycle, the financial incidence of new
investments and the uncertainty of the outcomes.
In both cases the SMEs grow, thanks to new recruits
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offering to carry on the research work they have
started in their own institutes. Researchers who are
unable to convince the institute of the potential eco-
nomic benefit of their work, or who are unable to
find the financial means, turn to existing SMEs.
They may know one or more founders from previ-
ous scientific exchanges in the Academy structure.
This acquaintance is not sufficient to open doors: in
order to take on the project, SMES managers must
be convinced of the potential of the proposed appli-
cations and their marketing and financing aspects.
At this stage the enterprise possesses a mix of R&D
projects involved in different S&T domains. New
researchers are supported to develop new applica-
tions. The client portfolio is broader and possibly
more heterogeneous (industrial firms, institutes,
households...) and geographically broader.
Investment in innovation remains strong and the
enterprise maintains its links to the scientific struc-
ture. The risk of failure has decreased overall, even
though the financial structure of the venture
remains weak.
4 Scope of the phenomenon
In Akademgorodok, the creation of sputnik firms is
a widespread phenomenon. For example, each
institute visited appeared to have a minimum of 6
sputniks with between 3 and 50 employees each.
This figure includes both officially registered and
unregistered firms in the innovative sector, but does
not include new firms invOlved in trade and other
activities. From discussion with institutes in
Akademgorodok, it is estimated that there are more
than 200 sputniks with more than 2,000 employees
involved at least part-time. They began to flourish
in 1988 after the 'law of cooperation' was passed by
the parliament. This rapid expansion decreased in
1993 due to the opposition of the Presidium of the
Siberian Branch of the Academy of Sciences.
The figures on the next page include all new firms
officially registered under the category of 'scientific
activity' in Akademgorodok:
The failure and bankruptcy rate is markedly lower
than that of other SMEs, as, at the initial stage, the
sputnik firms have few general expenses, no
invested capital and little debt. Rather than going
bankrupt, sputnik firms can endure long periods of
Figure 2: The Sputnik Process
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low activity The real rate of failure is therefore dif-
ficult to establish. During the fieldwork, of the
dozen enterprises visited only one had failedY
Moreover, the interviews revealed no unsuccessful
sputnik. A concentration of sputniks forming
around the most successful companies, which act as
venture capitalists, is likely and, indeed, is already
happening. The concentration is a result of the cre-
ation of new sputniks by the same team, which
prefers to diversify its risks by creating new firms,
rather than accept new projects in existing
structures.
3
Source: Inlormation transmited by Pensionnyy Fund, Akademgorodol<
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The Sputnik Revolution
Incubation
Gestation of the high-tech venture while
remaining employed in the institute. Business
idea based on personal scientific and technical
knowledge. Use of the instituteS facilities and
first contacts with the market.
Launch
First client orders and injection of working cap-
ital. Still strongly relying on the instituteS salary
and R&D facilities.
Consolidation
Expanding/stabilising business activity Officiai
agreements with the parent institute. Founders
could still be employed in the institute.
Widening commercial outlook.
Growth by expansion
Opening to new S&T business domains by
including new researchers from the same/other
institutes.
Growth by division
Creation of new independent enterprises from
the original spin-off to take charge of new tech-
nology business acquired as in point 4.
Nationally, the sputnik firms are obviously not reg-
istered as such by the Russian Federal Committee
for statistics; but Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development figures (CCET
1998: 28) figures show that, in 1996, 877,000
SMEs were registered in Russia, with 6 per cent
involved in scientific services. The number of SMEs
involved in 'Science and skilled scientific services'
grew by 340 per cent in 1992 and 181 per cent in
1993, but decreased by one fifth as for all other
SMEs in 1994 and by another 6 per cent in 1995
(CCET 1998: 30). All the registered sputniks visited
in Akademgorodok have a status equivalent to
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
registered
failed
160 160 126
1
19
1
4
8
0
7
0
2
0
na
This can also be explained by the fact that bankrupted enterprises are usually difficult to visit.
private limited companies: shares are generally
owned by the team and may only be sold or trans-
ferred with the agreement of all shareholders.
From case studies, it appears that the sputnik firm
typology of customers is broad. Mainly, customers
are local SMEs, research institutes or former
research institutes converted into medium- to high-
tech companies. Some Academy of Sciences insti-
tutes are still quite well off and in need of tailor-
made high-tech instruments. These are generally
large institutions employing more than 500
employees and partly involved in developing appli-
cations. Moreover, all former branch institutes have
been privatised and converted into sometimes very
successful engineering and scientific service compa-
nies. Some of the sputniks include in their reference
list large industrial companies, such as steel mills,
power plants or a diesel engine factory Of our sam-
ple, only two sputniks targeted their products to
private clients (3D design software) or households
(water cleaning systems). In sectors such as natural
resources (for example, gas, geological services,
mining) as well as in previously privileged sectors
(nuclear, space, lasers etc.) the level of existing tech-
nology is high and their developing needs indicate
that they could constitute good clients for sputnik
firms in the near future.
5 Conclusion
The phenomenon of spin-offs has been observed in
all economies that reward entrepreneurial initiative.
It is a natural process that allows industry to renew,
strengthen and consolïdate itself. The structure of
the Russian economy exhibits features that can sti-
fle the creation of SMEs. Most of them are due to
the Soviet heritage:
dinosaur enterprises: large and technologically
outmoded former combines with low-quality
output;
low entrepreneurial culture;
unresponsive capital market for SMEs.
The fact that civil research organisations have fed
the creation and consolidation of high-tech SMEs
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seems particularly encouraging for the evolutionary
path of the Russian economy It assumes the birth of
a more heterogeneous and fluid industrial system
endowed with multiple innovating forces. It
constitutes a stratum of entrepreneurs not merely
basing their activities on short-term speculation.
Paradoxically, it accomplishes the technology diffu-
sion ring between S&T and industry production:
the longstanding objective of civil science in
socialism.
It emerges that success or failure of the sputnik
process is strongly related to the history and evolu-
tion of the parent research organisations, for both
independent spin-offs and joint-stock enterprises.
How long and how intensive will the process
described be and what will be the new-born high-
tech SMEs' survival rate? A precise answer is diffi-
cult to gauge and would be of marginal interest. As
long as the institutes are unable to pay high enough
wages, researchers will be prepared to take risks to
improve their standard of living and the phenome-
non is likely to continue. The financial risk in a ven-
ture is often minimal and limited to the initia L
working capital, as researchers remain employed in
the institute and are free to develop their own high-
tech business concept. However, this presupposes
the pauperisation of institutes, the durability of the
new SMEs, and the development of local and
regional industry
It seems important to understand what factors cart
strengthen the effectiveness of the sputnik enter-
prise creation process. The success of the phenom-
enon is linked to a non-myopic reorganisation of
science in Russia. This means safeguarding the
research potential of institutes by supplying them
with managerial skills, know-how, support struc-
tures and a legal environment to challenge the new
scenario. The stake of high-tech SMF development
is central to the future of Russia, Indeed, success of
high-tech SMEs is based on a new model, linking
industry and S&T assets inherited from the past.
The ways these assets are capitalised can ensure the
survival of the Russian S&T system.
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